Abstract: This paper examines whether the risk-taking behavior of commercial banks in five countries of South-East Asia changed after the Asian Crises of 1997. The paper utilizes the framework created by Gruben et al (1997 Gruben et al ( , 1998 Gruben et al ( , and 2003 . It also examines the connection between the risk-taking behavior and depositor discipline of these banks after the Asian Crises of 1997. Based on bank level data from the Bank Scope, 2005 CD, the paper presents evidence that the state of depositor discipline is very weak in the selected countries even after the Asian Crises. Evidence also shows that the risk taking behavior of commercial banks did not change much before and after the Asian Crises of 1997, and that perfect competition prevailed both before and after the Crises in the banking sector. Finally, evidence also shows that the there is no connection between risk-taking behavior and depositor discipline.
Introduction
In the wake of successful regulatory changes in the developed countries 1 , many developing countries started to liberalize their financial sectors in the 1990s.
One of the major elements of such liberalization was the reform of the financial sector 2 with the twin objectives of increasing efficiency of the commercial banks and ensuring the soundness of the financial sector where commercial banks, public or private, play a major role. It was believed that such improvement in the banking sector would foster economic growth via efficient allocation of scarce capital, both domestic and foreign in the host countries. These have renewed the profession's interest on the issues of 'competition and stability' in the banking sector. 1 In the European Union the major regulations that opened up ways for changes in the banking sector is the Second Banking Coordination Directive of European Union allowing the Single Banking License in 1991. For 10 OECD countries, the Basel I Accord of 1988 initiated a change towards stricter capital requirements for parts of banks. In the USA, several regulations were implemented during the 1990s starting with the Basel I Accord, followed by the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 (emphasis on adequate capitalization of banks and allowing special privileges, or eligible operations, for banks deemed to be well-capitalized), Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 (allowed interstate banking), and the Financial Sector Modernization Act of 1999 (allowed banks to enter insurance, real estate and security related activities). 2 Often such financial sector reforms were implemented as part of larger packages of program, popularly known as SAP (Structural Adjustment Policies) sponsored by multinational development agencies, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Major elements of such financial sector reform package included but were not limited to the following: i) interest rate liberalization; ii) allowing entry of foreign banks; iii) privatization of government owned banks; and iv) abolishing government directed credit to preferred sectors etc. In short, the main objective of such reform programs was to put an end to financial repression.
One consequence of liberalization and privatization of the banking sector in the developing countries was that it increased competition in the banking sector of the host countries as documented by IMF, 1998 and several other studies 3 . Studies on the effect of competition on the financial sector, especially banks, have attracted wide-spread attention in recent years. Most of these studies deal with the impact of competition in banking sector on i) economic growth; ii) performance of banks; iii) efficiency change of banks; iv) adoption of modern technology by banks; v) stability of commercial banks; vi) the access of firms and households to financial services and external financing; vii) cost of financial intermediation 4 ; and vii) changes in the risktaking behavior of banks. In the present paper we focus on the last topic by studying two of the major factors of risk-taking behavior: depositor discipline and degree of competition.
Until recently, most of the literature in this field has concentrated on the determinants of financial or bank Crises (viz. Calomiris, 1990; de la Caudra and Valdes, 1992; Kaminksy and Rienhart, 1996; DemirgucKunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2005) , where incentives that lead banks to take on more risk took a back stage. However, our approach to studying the problem studies the changes in risk incentive directly and is relatively new. Following Gruben et al. (1997 Gruben et al. ( , 1998 Gruben et al. ( , and 2003 we examine the shifts in bank risk and factors that make such activity more attractive directly. Gruben et al (1999) pointed out that two major factors that cause banking panic are: lack of market (depositor) discipline and financial liberalization. Demirguc-Kunt (19981, 1998b , 2005 and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) found evidence indicating that risk-taking activities of banks increase in the wake of liberalization, especially in countries where financial institutions are underdeveloped, law enforcement is weak and regulatory supervision is inadequate, 3 Klaus et al (1997) 4 Demirguc-Kunt et al ( 2005) which is more likely in the developing countries. In developing countries, such liberalization often results in increased opportunities for excessive risk-taking and fraud.
Demirguc- Kunt (1998a Kunt ( , 1998b Kunt ( , and 2000a found evidence that risk-taking activities of banks also increase due to the moral hazard problem created by deposit insurance. This shows that explicit deposit insurance reduces depositor discipline, which increases moral hazard. Thus two factors directly related to stability of banks are market discipline and financial liberalization.
Apart from the recent increase in bank crises and the resultant academic interest, in June, 2004 5 the Basel Committee and the OECD countries finalized Basel II. It is expected that before long this will become the internationally accepted standard of bank supervision and regulation, just like its predecessor Basel I, which is at different phases of implementation in over 100 countries around the world. The primary focus of Basel II is risk measurement and risk management 6 , making the changes in risk behavior of banks in response to policy changes more important than before. At the same time, the Committee also decided that "market discipline" be made one of the three pillars, on which future financial regulation should be based, because such discipline imposes strong incentives for banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound, and efficient manner and also to hold adequate capital 7 . All this is expected to reduce the risk of a bank portfolio 8 . However, as pointed out, there is little empirical evidence on this issue, and hence this paper makes an attempt to cover that gap.
Despite strong interest and rapid progress in research on some issues, research on developing and emerging market countries remain incomplete, with the Thailand during the Asian Crises period of 1997. We focus directly on the changes immediately before and after financial Crises. (1) and so the regression is run four times. If depositor discipline exists, then all of these variables should be negatively related with the dependent variable.
Analysis
Appendix A presents the expected signs on this and all subsequent models (equation 9, 10 and 11). Equation (1) includes three control variables: EQTA: the ratio of equity capital to total assets. LTA: Log of total assets; and TDTL: a deposit configuration variable. Signs of the coefficients of EQTA and TDTL are ambiguous and should be empirically examined. If depositors prefer an adequately capitalized bank to an undercapitalized bank to the extent that they withdraw their fund from the undercapitalized to the adequately capitalized bank, then the EQTA variable will have a positive relationship with deposit growth. But this needs to be found empirically. Similar implication holds for TDTL. But for LTA, the Log of total assets 'too big to fail' hypothesis implies that bigger banks should be able to attract more deposit due to higher confidence of the depositors.
In the next step, we construct the index of competition using the simultaneous equation model that Shaffer (1989 Shaffer ( , 1993 Shaffer ( , and 1995 introduced. The model tests market power of a commercial banking system by estimating an index of market power (λ) and then identifying breaks in competitiveness by applying a dummy variable. To test if the degree of competition has increased following liberalization, that is, whether there is a difference before and after, the dummy variable is set to change value from "zero" to "one" after liberalization.
The index of market power (λ) captures the difference between firm's perceived marginal revenue schedule and the firm's demand schedule. Under competitive conditions, marginal cost can be set equal to perceived marginal revenue. If the firm's perceived marginal revenue schedule and the firm's demand schedule are identical, then setting marginal cost equal to perceived marginal revenue is the same as setting marginal cost equal to demand price, which is the condition of perfect competition. But if firms act in collusion, such as, duopoly or to the extreme monopoly, then they set marginal cost equal to perceived marginal revenue that corresponds to the industry's marginal revenue curve.
A demand function for commercial bank services is written as follows:
Where Q is quantity, P is price, Y is a vector of exogenous variables, α is a vector of demand equation parameters to be estimated, ε is a random error term.
Actual (as distinguish from perceived) marginal revenue 9 is: Let c(Q, W, β) be the average firm's marginal cost function, where W is a vector of exogenous supply side variables and β is a vector of supply side parameters to be estimated. Maximizing firms will set perceived marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, or where η is a random error term.
If firms act as price takers so that they do not perceive a difference between their marginal revenue functions and demand function, then λ=0. If firms act as a joint monopoly (λ=1), clearly perceiving a difference between their demand and marginal revenue functions, they set output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.
Intermediate values of λ correspond to other oligopoly solution concepts. A Cournot equilibrium is suggested when λ = 1/n.
To estimate λ, it is necessary to estimate simultaneously specifications of both (2) and (5), treating P and Q as endogenous variables. The demand function (2) 
Where Q is output quantity, P is output price, Y is a measure of macroeconomic activity, assumed to be an exogenous variable, and Z is the price of a substitute for bank output, also assumed to be exogenous. The interaction terms, the products PZ, PY and YZ, are necessary to permit rotation of the demand curve as required to identify λ.
Following the model of Shaffer (1993) 
Based on this equation, in the first step, the value of -λ represents a typical bank's percentage deviation of output from competitive level. This -λ is smaller than zero implies that output is below the competitive levels. If λ is zero it implies that output is at the competitive level. And -λ larger than zero implies that output exceeds that of competitive levels. This is called "super-competition". This means that banks are operating at a point where marginal cost is larger than perceived marginal benefit.
However, equation (9) is not configured to facilitate analysis of breaks in bank behavior. To allow for breaks, we rely on the following specification of (6):
Where D is a dummy variable to be more fully explained below and ξ is a random error term. The system of equation represented by (6) and (10) β is negative and large, that will imply that banks significantly increased the riskiness of its behavior after liberalization or privatization. Appendix A presents the signs on these equations (9 and 10).
As we have already pointed out, Gruben et al. (2003) The Rosse (1982, 1987 ) (henceforth PR) approach is used to assess the competitive nature of banking industries starting from 1998. The PR Hstatistic, which will be our index of competition, is calculated from reduced form bank revenue equations. It measures the sum of the elasticities of the total revenue of the banks with respect to the bank's input prices. The PR H-statistic is adopted from and its values and interpretations are presented in Table A below 13 . 
Empirical Results
We present the summary statistics in Overall, we found that the state of depositor discipline was very weak. Most of the asset quality proxies had insignificant coefficients, and even when they were significant, the coefficients were very low / close to zero, indicating the impact if very small. As a result, we conclude that total deposits scaled by total assets are probably not related to changes in asset quality. Given the role of government guarantees, this is hardly surprising. This can be supported by the recent findings of Mondschean et al (1998) in the case of Poland. These authors find that use of explicit deposit guarantees starting in late 1994 has removed the use of market discipline as a check on these banks behavior. Before the deposit guarantee program depositors extracted a price of risk, but after the program was initiated that stopped. Model given in equations 6 and 10. None of the lambda coefficients in the five countries are significant. This implies that the coefficient is statistically equal to zero, indicating perfect competition. The evidence is in line with Gruben et al. (1997 Gruben et al. ( , 1998 Gruben et al. ( , 2003 papers. Similarly, beta five coefficients are all insignificant indicating to a no change in competitive behavior of banks before and after 1996.
In Table 5 , we combine the index of competition from Table 4 (panel a), with the index of depositor discipline (panel b -coefficient of proxy for asset quality) in Table 3 in order to test the link between the two. Several alternative plots are tested but results do not show any definite relationship between the two indexes. As a result, we do not find evidence suggested by Gruben et al (2003) that these were inversely related. Therefore, we fail to establish that in the absence or in the presence of weak depositor discipline, banks tend to take higher risks as those papers concluded. are in the middle. But all these values are less than one, which is again indication of collusive behavior in the banking sector of these countries.
Conclusions
The present study provides evidence on the behavior of banks with respect to risk taking and strength of depositor discipline within the context of South East Asian Crises of 1997. The results are in line with that of Gurben (1998 Gurben ( , 2003 and other studies. Even in the after-math of Asian Crises, the strength of depositor discipline (tested as a negative relationship between depositor discipline and assets quality) was absent. Depositors as a group did not withdraw deposits from banks in reaction to a decline in their asset quality.
This also highlights the importance of the need to improve measures that strengthen depositor discipline, such as, the measures put forward in Basel II. Timely and accurate dissemination of information can go a long way to solve these problems. Overall, any measure that enhances transparency and accountability of the decision making of banks is welcome. These are some of the objectives of Basel II.
For the test of a break in the competitive behavior of banks before and after 1996, we find no change in banks' risk-taking behavior before and after the crisis. Also the index has a value of zero, implying competitive behavior of banks in these countries. This to is in line with Gruben et al. (1998 Gruben et al. ( , 2003 . However, use of PR-methodology to measure bank competitive behavior indicates the monopolistic competition and not perfect competition exists in these markets.
However, we did not find a consistent link between depositor discipline and bank risk taking, which can be explained by the weak state of depositor discipline. At least until today depositor discipline has not grown strong enough to affect banks risk-taking behavior.
More needs to be done to make depositor discipline effective. In the above, table we do not get evidence. '***' significant at the .01 percent level; '**' significant at the .05 percent level; and '*' significant at the .10 percent level. Note: As mentioned in the text, LAMBDA (equation 1.10) is the index of competition adopted from Gruben et al (1997 Gruben et al ( , 1998 Gruben et al ( , and 2003 is the logarithm of total assets ( to control for potential size effect). Natural logarithm of all variables is taken. 
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